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The Victim's Fortune: The Struggle for Restitution for
Holocaust Victims
The Victim's Fortune, by John Authers and Richard Wolffe,
is a story of lawyers, businessmen, government officials and Jewish
leaders "striving for justice, and... squabbling over money" owed
to Holocaust victims.1 The book explores a "deadly matrix of
strategies," including competing class action lawsuits, independent
auditing committees, extreme governmental pressure and threats
of crippling economic sanctions.2 It is the story of the restitution
effort for victims of the Holocaust worldwide, and how it
originated in Switzerland before fueling a restitution blitzkrieg
through Eastern Europe.3 Authers and Wolffe expose ego driven
compromises, and a campaign often willing to sacrifice moral
reparation for monetary compensation.4
This book note focuses on how The Victim's Fortune
catalogues the strategy used in Switzerland to gain restitution for
Holocaust victims and its evolution into a model for similar
restitution efforts in Italy, France and Germany.5 Part I discusses
the restitution effort's origin in lawsuits against Swiss banks.6 Part
II addresses the adaptation of the Swiss model to challenge Italian
insurers.' Part III relates the formula's strategic role in the French
recovery.8 Part IV culminates with the direct confrontation of
Germany.9 In whole, this note illustrates common themes, the
recurring structure of the Swiss model and its successful
application to the various circumstances confronting the restitution
campaign.
1. JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIM'S FORTUNE (2002).
2. Id. at 105.
3. Id.
4. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 10-63 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 64-97 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 98-146 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 147-169 and accompanying text.
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I. THE Swiss BANKS AND THE ORIGIN OF A
RESTITUTION MODEL
Switzerland, historically famed for its neutrality policy and
secrecy in bank dealings, may appear an awkward starting point
for a restitution campaign necessitated by arguably the most
monstrous acts in modern history.' ° However, in 1995, Kaspar
Villiger, the Swiss president, drew attention to Switzerland when
he issued an apology to all Jews who were refused entry into the
country during the war." Villiger's "noble" apology was met with
international scrutiny. 2 As major media sources such as Globes
and the Wall Street Journal began questioning the Swiss role in
World War II, Swiss banks became the first target of the
restitution effort. 13 To address the increasingly hostile
environment, the banks conducted an internal audit linking 893
dormant Swiss accounts with roughly $24 million worth of assets
taken from Holocaust survivors. 4  This finding undercut
traditional perceptions of Swiss innocence, enhanced the validity
of potential claims and caused speculation that banks had profited
unfairly from Holocaust victims to run rampant through the Swiss
political body. 5
Edgar Bronfman and Israel Singer, representatives of the
World Jewish Congress (WJC) who were committed to recovering
money wrongfully held in dormant accounts, ignited the fight
against the Swiss. 16 Bronfman, one of the biggest campaign donors
in American Democratic politics, legitimized the effort in the
United States and offered a direct link to the Clinton
administration."' Singer, not content with Bronfman's connections
10. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. Globes suggested as much as $7 billion in Holocaust survivors' money lay
dormant in Swiss banks. Id. The Wall Street Journal ran an investigative story
recounting survivors' struggles to reclaim their Swiss accounts. Id.
14. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 7.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id. Edgar Bronfman, Sr., is the Canadian businessman who ran Seagrams, a
distillery and entertainment conglomerate that helped him accumulate an estimated
$3.3 billion personal fortune. Id. He was also the acting President of the WJC. Id. at
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to Democratic power, sought to fortify their position through the
creation of a bipartisan alliance. 8 He accomplished his. goal of
gathering bipartisan support by introducing Bronfman to
Republican New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato, the chair of the
Senate Banking Committee, 9 and an astute politician who realized
the restitution story's political worth.2" The addition of D'Amato
was a major coup, allowing the White House to remain silent as
the Senator pushed the Swiss to address the dormant accounts.21
The formation of this powerful political alliance was crucial to the
restitution effort's success, and intense political pressure became
the first prong of the Swiss restitution model.22
George Krayer, president of the Swiss Bankers'
Association, organized the Swiss response to the dormant account
allegations.23 He first cited a 1962 Swiss government decree
ordering banks and other companies to report all assets of "foreign
or stateless persons subject to racial, religious or political
persecution.24 Krayer claimed the banks followed the decree "as
diligently and completely as possible under the circumstances.,
25
He then called particular attention to an active system allowing
people to make claims on dormant accounts.2 6 However, after
several rounds of preliminary negotiations with the WJC, the Swiss
6. In the 1996 elections, the Democratic Party and President Bill Clinton counted
Seagram's U.S. subsidy as their biggest soft money contributor. Id. at 12.
18. Id. at 10-16. Israel Singer is an ordained Orthodox Jew from New York, NY.
Id. at 11. Before his ordination, he marched with Martin Luther King, Jr. on twenty-
six occasions. Id. A highly successful real estate entrepreneur, Singer earned
doctorates in political science and teaching in Israel and New York. Id. He became
active in New York politics and Jewish affairs in the 1970s. Id.
19. Id. at 14. This position gave Senator D'Amato oversight authority over all
banks operating in the United States. Id. This included several lucrative Swiss Wall
Street operations. Id.
20. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 14. "This was made in heaven!"
D'Amato allegedly shouted several times at Singer and Bronfman. Id. It did not
hurt that Brooklyn, D'Amato's central political staple, was also home to the world's
largest concentration of Holocaust survivors. Id. Although Bronfman found such
behavior distasteful, they were pleased to leave Washington with the feeling that
Senator D'Amato would not hesitate to add his political weight to their effort. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 8.
25. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 8.
26. Id.
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agreed to create an "Independent Committee of Eminent
Persons" (ICEP) to conduct an audit to determine any fair amount
the Swiss banks still owed to the survivors.27 Formation of this
independent commission was the second prong of the Swiss
restitution model, and such committees were characteristic of
future settlement efforts.2 8
On October 4, 1996, Ed Fagan, a little known personal
injury lawyer from New York, filed Weisshaus v. Union Bank of
Switzerland et al., a class action suit demanding more than $20
billion in damages and alleging the Swiss deliberately stole the
accounts of Gizella Weishaus and others.2 9 Shortly thereafter,
Michael Hausfeld, ° a well-known New York attorney with
extensive class action experience, filed Friedman v. UBS, a
complaint alleging Swiss participation in a conspiracy to help the
Nazis launder gold and banking profits from slave labor in
concentration camps.31 In an effort to match the experience and
prestige of the Hausfeld camp, Fagan sought out Bob Swift, a
notorious Philadelphia human rights litigator whose most recent
case involved an "epic suit" against Ferdinand Marcos, the former
president of the Phillipines.32  Faced with the prospect of
27. Id. at 23. The resulting agreement called for auditors to get "unfettered
access to all relevant files in banking institutions regarding dormant accounts and
other assets and financial instruments deposited before, during and immediately after
the Second World War." Id. at 24. This represented a huge concession for the Swiss
in that it abandoned their demand to preserve the sanctity of their institutional
secrecy. Id.
28. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
29. Id. at 38. Each case discussed in this note was filed in state court in Brooklyn,
New York. Id. There was proper jurisdiction over the cases because the named
Swiss banks had branches in New York and many Holocaust survivors lived in the
state. Id. This ensured that the jurors for the trial would be drawn from the world's
largest Jewish community. Id.
30. Id. at 39. Unlike Fagan, Hausfeld had substantial ties to the Jewish
community. Id. Named after an uncle killed in the Holocaust, Hausfeld lost ten
relatives to the Nazis, grew up in a Jewish Brooklyn community where parents would
show each other their camp tattoos and adopted the Swiss bank cause as a moral
crusade. Id. Representing the gulf in motivation among the divisive attorneys, Bob
Swift remarked to Hausfeld, the moral crusader, "What are you getting so emotional
about? This is just a matter of money." Id. at 44.
31. Id. at 41. The Friedman claim was 109 pages in length, roughly ten times the
size of the Weishauss complaint. Id.
32. Id. at 42.
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competing lawsuits,33 Judge Edward Korman decided there could
be no legal peace without some form of cooperation. 34 Therefore,
he created an executive committee of ten lawyers, led jointly by
Hausfeld and Swift. 35 The prospect of lawsuits scared the Swiss
"far more than any of the tactics yet unveiled, 36 and the team
began to emphasize punitive damages that could push the damage
result far higher than any figure expected from the ICEP audit.37
This complex litigation strategy encompassing competing lawsuits,
teams of class action attorneys and the threat of United States
discovery to leverage settlement became the third prong of the
Swiss restitution model.38
Israel Singer saw the judicial response to the pending
litigation as the perfect opportunity to reengage the political
power of the Clinton administration.39 On May 7, 1997, the
administration became publicly involved when Stuart Eizenstat, a
member of the Department of Commerce, released a scathing
report, Eizenstat accused the Swiss National Bank (SNB)-the
Swiss equivalent of the Federal Reserve-of prolonging the Nazi
war effort by knowingly receiving and laundering gold taken from
Holocaust victims and occupied countries." SNB's acceptance of
German deposits totaling more than two times the German pre-
war gold reserves formed the substantive basis for Eizenstat's
33. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 75. Mel Weiss, an attorney
representative of the difficult challenge the Swiss faced, was also preparing his own
claim. Id. Weiss's firm, Milberg Weiss, had won $692 million in the past ten years,
with his share totaling $102 million. Id. Notorious for backroom dealing when his
opponent needed to avoid court, Weiss typically charged contingency fees amounting
to one third of the award, but had decided to fight this battle for free. Id. Weiss
believed that "fifty-two years of obfuscation" would make it impossible to
reconstruct any accurate damage figure, and as such, his sole goal was to deliver a
measure of justice commensurate with the wrong done. Id. He was ready to look
beyond the banks to target the Swiss government. Id.
34. Id. at 44.
35. Id. at 44-46.
36. Id. at 48. The Swiss saw U.S. Federal judges and juries as "both powerful and
unpredictable." Id.
37. Id.
38. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 44.
39. Id. at 50.
40. Id. Eizenstat worked as Undersecretary of State before later becoming
Deputy Treasury Secretary. Id. at xii.
41. Id. at 51.
2003] 427
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allegations.42  He argued the sophisticated bankers had
constructive-if not actual-knowledge that a significant amount
of the German deposits were stolen.43 As tensions mounted with
the increased political rhetoric, Singer formulated the economic
attack that would become the final prong of the Swiss model.'
From the beginning of the Swiss restitution effort, Singer
realized that if all else failed, the threat of private and public
sanctions could wield considerable power.45 To implement his
plan to intensify the pressure on the Swiss, Singer enlisted Alan
Hevesi,46 New York City's comptroller, whose position gave him
control over one of the world's largest borrowers and pension
funds.47 Hevesi, in turn, compounded his influence by enlisting
Matt Fong, the state Treasurer of California, who promised to bar
the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS)-
the largest U.S. pension fund-from buying any new Swiss
stocks.48 Hevesi then invited over nine hundred American
financial officers to an "educational gathering" in Manhattan,49
with more than one hundred-fifty of the most influential of them
agreeing to attend.5" The meeting's stated purpose was to commit
to a "moratorium" on sanctions that would be imposed if the Swiss
failed to negotiate a settlement within ninety days.51 Hevesi's
42. Id. at 52. SNB accepted approximately $400 million in German deposits, or
roughly $3.9 billion in 1997 money. Id. German pre-war gold deposits were valued
at approximately $200 million. Id.
43. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 52-54. The Swiss countered attacks on
the morality of their decision to stay neutral by recalling that the United States chose
to stay neutral for more than two years after Hitler invaded Poland. Id.
44. Id. at 62.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 63. Hevesi, the grandson of a chief rabbi of Hungary who had lost
many of his ancestors in the Holocaust, had morally committed to the process long
before Singer contacted him. Id. After reading in The New Yorker that the chairman
of UBS's board viewed the effort as "really to do with the Jewish conspiracy to take
over the world's most prestigious financial centers," Hevesi was prepared to join the
fight. Id. at 65.
47. Id. at 63. At the time, the New York City pension fund held shares worth
$69.55 million in the big three Swiss banks. Id. at 65.
48. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 67.
49. Id. at 69.
50. Id.
51. Id. This was actually Singer's suggestion. Id. Hevesi, who had no real
intention to impose further sanctions, greeted the suggestion as a perfect way to
increase leverage by delaying an action he had no plans to implement. Id.
428 [Vol. 7
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threat was to "impose an economic boycott as severe as that of
South Africa years before, 52 and he supported his statement with
numbers showing that the United States was Switzerland's largest
trading partner, with more than 400 Swiss companies doing $15.4
billion in annual export business with the United States. 3 This
threat of crippling economic sanctions was the fourth and final
prong of the Swiss restitution model.54
As pressure mounted from both the public and private
sectors, Judge Korman was reticent to see the crimes of the
Holocaust tried in his court.5 In August of 1998, he called the
parties together to propose settlement alternatives.56 Sensitive to
Switzerland's repeated refusal to accept any settlement implicating
its government, Korman tailored an agreement releasing Swiss
National Bank from liability, while forcing major Swiss private
banks, such as Credit Suisse and UBS, to cover the nation's full
liability.57 In the final proposal, the Swiss banks approved a $1.25
billion settlement conditioned on their nation being protected
from any conceivable legal attack on its war record.58 With the
agreement, the Swiss banks transformed settlement of the dormant
bank account controversy into a national settlement that bought
peace for all of Switzerland.59
The settlement for Switzerland did not, however, end the
restitution effort.6 ° Instead, it was the first shot in the war to
"reopen the history books across Europe," 61 with the four-pronged
52. Id. at 92.
53. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 92. It was his belief that in the world
economy, well-organized interest groups were better positioned to take on companies
than were sovereign states with their legal and diplomatic restrictions. Id. at 68. The
State Department did not support the unilateral actions of the financial sector, urging
Hevesi to stop mingling with foreign policy and reminding him that trade sanctions
came under their purview, but he refused to back down. Id.
54. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE supra note 1.
55. Id. at 96.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id. at 98.
58. Id. at 100. This would have in effect made the independent Swiss
Commission irrelevant, wasting an audit that had taken two years and consumed $500
million. Id.
59. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 104.
60. Id. at 105.
61. Id.
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Swiss campaign-governmental pressure, independent auditing
committees, competing class action lawsuits and threats of
economic sanctions-becoming a model for challenges in Italy,
France and Germany.62 Somber in victory, Abraham Foxman, the
national director of the Anti-Defamation League, recalled the
origins of the campaign:
Six million Jews died because they were Jews, not
because they had money or bank accounts. Six
million Jews, 99.9 percent, didn't have Swiss bank
accounts, didn't have gold, didn't have jewelry, or
art. They perished because of who they were. This
debate, this discussion, as important as it is, skewed
the whole message, the lesson, the truth of the
Holocaust. I do not want the last sound bite of the
history of the twentieth century to be Jews and their
money.63
II. TAKING THE FIGHT TO THE ITALIAN INSURERS
Italian insurers became the second target of the restitution
effort due primarily to the confluence of two seemingly isolated
events: the denial of Adolf Stern's family life insurance policies
and an Italian insurance company's decision to purchase one of
Israel's major insurers.' First, Adolf Stern,65 a retired clothing
salesman who lost a father, wife and daughter to the Auschwitz gas
chambers while spending time in six different Nazi concentration
camps himself, was repeatedly denied compensation by Generali,66
an Italian insurer who refused to honor the deceased Stern family
members' policies due to a lack of formal documentation.67
62. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
63. Id. at 102-03.
64. See id. at 107-118.
65. Id. at 107-08. Stern was a highly successful property developer with a
prosperous family. Id. He had contacts in Knesset and in both the British and Israeli
media, which made him a formidable opponent. Id.
66. Id. at 109. Generali was a company founded by Jews, and one that had
emerged as one of the premier insurers for Jews in prewar Eastern Europe. Id.
67. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 107.
[Vol. 7
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Second, in early 1996, Generali attempted to buy Midgal, Israel's
largest insurance company.68 As Generali offered $330 million for
the company, Stern became convinced that a "pillar of the Israeli
economy" was about to be purchased with Holocaust victims'
stolen money.69 Stern took great umbrage at what he viewed as a
serious affront to all Jews, and he adamantly set forth to expose
the connection between Generali's wealth and the company's
outstanding liabilities to Holocaust survivors.7"
Guido Pastori, Generali's chief legal counsel, denied
Stern's allegations on three grounds: first, Pastori disavowed the
viability of any legal claim due to the "very considerable number
of years" elapsed; second, Pastori claimed that Generali's post-war
nationalization alleviated any corporate responsibility for policies
issued before the war; third, he insisted the -company held no
record of the Stern policies.71 Presuming that he was negotiating
from a position of strength, Pastori readily agreed to have his staff
look through company archives for outstanding policies.72 As a
result, on December 10, 1996, Pastori's staff discovered a copy of
Stern's father's life insurance policy, as well as 301,000 other
outstanding pre-war policies insuring Holocaust victims.73 An
embarrassed Pastori forwarded the records to Stern, and Generali
acknowledged possession of the insurance records.74
Against the backdrop of the ongoing Swiss campaign and
with the newly found records,75 Stern representatives pressed for
$10 million to settle the claims of what those involved figured
would now only amount to a few hundred families. 7 6 Generali
countered with an offer of $1 million.77 However, Scott Vayer, a
New York attorney retained by Generali, urged the company to
68. Id. at 110.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 112-13.
72, AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 113.
73. Id. at 114.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 115. As a corollary, the Knesset began to investigate Generali's
acquisition of Midgal, and the media began to circulate the story. Id.
76. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 116.
77. Id.
2003]
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consider offering $12 million.78 "It's really inappropriate for us to
do what's demanded of us in this context. So we should do better.
We can hardly be criticized for that," he advised.79 The board of
directors agreed, and the Generali Trust was established to fund
"good works, memorials, and humanitarian gestures."8  Stern
acquiesced to the deal under the stipulation that claimants with
Generali insurance policies must be compensated from the Trust
first.8" The agreement was signed, and Generali felt its obligation
was met.82
However, Marta Cornell, a sixty-nine year old Holocaust
survivor living in Queens, New York, initiated events that
ultimately upset the Generali settlement, clearing the way for the
implementation of the Swiss restitution model in a protracted
Italian campaign.83 After reading about Ed Fagan's lawsuit against
the Swiss banks, she called him with a story similar to Adolf
Stern's. 84  Fagan quickly filed Marta Cornell v. Assicurazioni
Generali.85 He was not the only American attorney preparing for
litigation.86 Deborah Senn, the insurance commissioner for
Washington state, received complaints from more than fifty
Holocaust survivors living in the Seattle area who held unpaid
insurance claims.87 However, few had documentation of their
policies, and Generali would not publish corporate records.88
Without documentation linking the survivors and their relatives'
policies, there were no valid claims.89 So Senn used federal
statutes delegating the regulation of insurers to the states to
prepare legislation in Washington state that would allow her to
revoke the license of any insurer that refused to publish Holocaust
78. Id. at 117.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 118.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 119.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 120.
86. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.




2003] HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION EFFORTS 433
victims' names.9" New York, California, and Florida followed
suit.9" Thus, Generali's hope for a quick, clean settlement was now
over, and they faced a coalition of states armed with lessons from
the Swiss campaign.
92
The parallels to the Swiss restitution campaign were
striking: first, the potential for competing lawsuits forced Italian
companies to consider the possibility of exposing themselves to
court procedures in the United States; second, political pressure
was threatening the sanctity of corporate records; and, third,
economic sanctions would prohibit the companies from doing
business in America.93 As a result of this increasing pressure, Italy
formed an independent advisory commission to oversee possible
settlement options.94  Insurers throughout Europe-Allianx of
Germany, Axa of France, and Basler Leben, Winterthru, and
Zurich of Switzerland-soon joined as a preemptive measure to
retain some control over the settlement.95 Thus, although the
details of the proposed settlement had not been finalized, with the
implementation of the commission all four prongs of the Swiss
settlement-competing lawsuits, independent auditing
committees, governmental pressure and threats of economic
sanctions-were present in the Italian effort.96 The Swiss model
had evolved, leaving behind the frenzied public rhetoric of the
original campaign without sacrificing its level of success.97
III.RECLAIMING ART FROM THE FRENCH
While the Swiss faced claims against their banks and the
Italians faced claims against their insurers, France was confronted
with allegations that nearly two thousand pieces of art hanging in
French museums and government buildings were stolen from the
90. Id. at 122.
91. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 122.
92. See id. at 125.
93. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
94. Id. at 131.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
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Jews.98 However, unlike the Swiss and Italians, the French openly
acknowledged possession of the stolen art, as they had for over a
half-century.99 Putting the problem in perspective, Ronal Lauder,
chairman of the French Modern Museum of Art, testified that
"every institution, art museum and private collection" included
stolen art, and he estimated that some 110,000 stolen pieces, worth
between $10 billion and $30 billion, existed.'00
Therefore, the French restitution effort faced a new
difficulty: instead of fighting to establish a claim, the argument
focused on French responsibility.'' The campaign was forced to
address France's worst modern taboo-French complicity under
the Nazi puppet regime of the Vichy.' °2 Since the war, the French
adamantly maintained that the Vichy had been an aberration and
an "illegitimate regime that that French Republic was not
responsible for.' 0 3 However, in July 1995, newly elected French
president Jacques Chirac changed the course of the controversy
forever, admitting a "never ending debt" to the victims of the
Holocaust. 0 4 "Those dark hours sully our history forever and are
an insult to our past and our traditions. Yes, the criminal madness
of the occupier was aided by the French, by the French state," he
said.'0 5 His words represented a new generation of French citizens,
a generation willing to revisit how their parents had dealt with the
Vichy.0 6
After Chirac's admission, the French campaign began to
emerge in the familiar pattern established in Switzerland and
Italy.'0 7 First, the French formed the Matteoli Commission to
investigate French wrongs.0 8 Then, in January of 1998, lawyers
from New York filed suit against nine international banks
98. Id. at 134.
99. Id. at 135.
100. Id. at 137.
101. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 134.




106. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 141.
107. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
108. Id. at 142.
434 [Vol. 7
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including France's Societe Generale, Credit Lyonnais, and Banque
Paribas.' °9 To further substantiate their claim, the suit included
Barclays, a British bank, and American financial institutions Chase
Manhattan and JP Morgan, each of which had a presence in
France during the Nazi occupation." 0 The suit alleged that the
banks and the Vichy authorities "systematically plunder[ed] cash,
gold, foreign exchange, securities, jewelry, art treasures,
businesses, equipment, and other real, personal and/or intangible
property.""' The suit sought full accounting of the looted assets
and their return, as well as the disgorgement of any unjust
profits." 2 As in the actions taken against the Swiss, claims against
the entire nation were brought against France's premier financial
institutions. "' With lawsuits and the independent commission in
place, only American political pressure and the threat of economic
sanctions were missing from the four-pronged Swiss restitution
model. '
Even after Chirac acknowledged publicly French
responsibility, the nation's banks developed a two-prong
defense." 5 First, the Germans were to blame." 6 Second, Charles
de Gualle had ordered the return of 'all Jewish assets and
restitution was a thing of the past."' Despite their steadfast denial
of culpability, the French banks were dealt a critical blow when
Barclays Bank, the only British institution among those being
sued, settled its case by establishing a $3.6 million fund for 335
claimants, exposing France to mounting pressure from the
American political and financial communities." 8 In the wake of
the Barclays settlement, French banks appeared "obstructive,
unreasonable, and unwilling to face up to wartime guilt."
' 9
109. Id. at 143.
110. Id. at 143.
111. Id.
112. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 144.
113. Id.
114. See generally AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 146.
118. Id. at 152.
119. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 152.
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On September 14, 1999, a meeting of the Banking
Committee of the United States House of Representatives sought
to bring together the competing views of the French and American
campaigners." 2 The meeting began with the American delegation
blasting the Matteoli Commission and the French effort for its lack
of "transparency and accountability," saying that even the Swiss
commission was more open.' 2' French authorities bristled at the
Swiss comparison, reasserting their claim that they were a
conquered nation acting under the influence of a German
occupier, not a free nation of its own will like Switzerland.1
2 2
However, after the meeting's bitter public discourse, both sides
agreed to compromise. 123 The French allowed a member of the
American delegation onto the Matteoli commission in exchange
for a softening of the anti-French rhetoric that had filled the
airwaves.
124
However, the class action lawyers were not willing to
accede so easily.1 25 On March 15, 2000, the lawyers gathered in
Judge Sterling Johnson's courtroom to protest French attempts to
dismiss their cases. 126 In reviewing the motion, the judge was most
concerned with the plaintiffs' insistence on a judicially sanctioned
accounting instead of the French government's system for dealing
with claims. 127 Judge Korman specifically questioned the good
faith basis for the banks' claims that they were cooperating with
the government to achieve the Matteoli commissions objectives.
28
In response to the judge's expressed concern, the plaintiffs cited
France's avoidance of claims for over half a century. 29 The French
maintained that the court had no authority to set an adequate
remedy in the case as the necessary documents would never come
120. Id. at 158.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 159.
123. Id. at 164-72.
124. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 162.
125. Id. at 164.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 165.
128. Id.
129. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 165.
436 [Vol. 7
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under court control.1 31 In addition, they reminded the court that
the Swiss had settled under the authority of the American courts
over two years earlier and still had not made a single payment to
the survivors."'
While the lawyers waited for the judge's ruling, the final
Matteoli report was released. 132 According to the report, over
50,000 companies and buildings had been seized and sold, and the
contents of 38,000 apartments had been converted. 33 In addition,
more than 100,000 works of art and several million books had been
looted. 34 Furthermore, the banks froze over 80,000 accounts. 35
On the other hand, the commission confirmed that restitution had
been far more widespread than had been originally realized.
36
Roughly 92% of the bank accounts and 80% of the apartment
losses had been returned. 137  Then, in September 2000, Judge
Johnson found for the plaintiffs on all counts, a sweeping victory
unprecedented in prior restitution litigation. 38 In doing so, he
determined that his ability to hear the case was based on possible
breaches of international law and the lack of an alternative court
to hear the claim. 139  As in the Swiss model, faced with the
possibility of discovery under the procedures of the United States
and given a benchmark set by an independent commission, the
time was ripe for the French to seek a settlement.
14
The two final pieces of the Swiss model-American
political pressure and threats of economic sanctions-helped force
the final settlement. 14' The impending departure of the Clinton
administration, scheduled to leave office in four months time, left
Eizenstat with little time to utilize his strong ties to the
130. Id.
131. Id. at 165.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 167.
134. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 167.
135. Id. at 167.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 169.
139. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 169.
140. See id. at 170.
141. Id. at 171.
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presidency. 42 In addition, Hevesi began talk of impending
economic sanctions from America's financial community. 4 3 As a
result, focus turned toward giving the class action lawyers
settlement alternatives to litigation based on an agreement that the
American government would support dismissing pending claims
from the U.S. courts. 44 Under the pressure of the self-imposed
deadline, Eizenstat pulled together a deal where the French paid
$22.5 million, allowing each individual claimant to collect between
$1,500 and $3,000.145 Once again, the four-pronged Swiss
restitution model effectuated a settlement.
146
IV.THE GERMAN INDUSTRIAL GIANTS
In March of 1998, amid this increasingly favorable climate
for restitution, a class action lawsuit seeking restitution for forced
laborers used in German factories was filed.1 47 As had been the
pattern in the Swiss and Italian campaigns, Ed Fagan was the first
to file suit. 48  His claim included ten industrial giants such as
Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen, Siemens and Krupp, and he predicted
his case would attract "millions of people." 149  Unfortunately for
142. Id. at 170. As the settlement talks progressed, Eizenstat picked up a crucial
endorsement, winning the support of Colin Powell, President-elect Bush's incoming
Secretary of State, who pledged to keep him in his role if negotiations ran into the
new administration. Id. at 179. However, Eizenstat, feeling that the artificial time
constraints were helping to drive the deal, chose to keep this information to himself.
Id.
143. See id. at 160-161.
144. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 176-777.
145. See id. at 179.
146. See id. at 181. In an interesting aside, as the talks closed, Parisian historians
asked the inevitable questions. See id. Was the settlement a sign of things to come?
Id. If so, would America be haunted by its action as African Americans were just
beginning to raise the issue of racial reparations? Id.
147. Id. at 188.
148. Id. at 189.
149. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 189. Ironically, the initial target was
not a German company, but was instead a pillar of American commercialism-Ford
Motor Company. Id. at 188. "Unlike other enemy-owned companies, Ford Werke
[Ford's German subsidiary] remained under American control during the war thanks
in large part to Henry Ford's friendship with Adolf Hitler," an admirer of Ford's anti-
Semitic pamphlet "The International Jew." Id. In 1943, forced laborers constituted
half of Ford Werke's labor force. Id.
149. Id. at 189.
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Fagan, in his rush to file he included Eicon, a company founded by
the children of Holocaust survivors, and he was forced to promptly
amend his complaint.15 ° As was the pattern, a competing set of
lawyers, Mel Weiss and Deborah Sturman, quickly filed a second
complaint naming Volkswagen as the primary defendant. 5'
Within months, another ten suits were filed.
15 2
The German companies benefited from lessons learned
from the previous campaigns. First, they quickly established
independent commissions to distribute funds to compensate
survivors in hopes of deferring substantial international pressure, a
tactic that worked in Switzerland, Italy and France.'53 Next, they
relied on previous restitution campaigns, as had France, citing laws
that paid nearly $96 billion in claims to survivors by 1997.114
Finally, Germans insisted on consolidating all claims against their
nation from the start of the negotiations, and they had a
government willing to partner with the private sector, which
clearly distinguished this campaign from the others."5  The
Germans wanted to avoid the American lawyers, and they instead
sought no less than a new treaty with the United States, "an
agreement negotiated among diplomats to resolve the issue
forever."' 5 6 The leading German official on Holocaust restitution
stated, "[t]his is a government-to-government affair to be settled
between governments. What kind of role would American lawyers
have in that?"' 5 7 However, political risks precluded any possibility
that the United States Senate would ratify a treaty limiting
Holocaust claims.
58
The Germans scored an early victory when two New Jersey
judges dismissed five of the lawsuits. Judge Dickinson Debevoise
wrote, "[e]very human instinct yearns to remediate in some way
the immeasurable wrongs inflicted upon so many millions of
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 190.
153. AUTHERS & WOLFFE, supra note 1, at 191.
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people by Nazi Germany so many years ago, wrongs in which
corporate Germany unquestionably participated." '159 Despite its
sympathy, the court conceded it did not have the power to do so.
160
Debevsoise wrote, "[b]y what conceivable standard could a single
court arrive at a fair allocation of resources among all the
deserving groups? By what practical means could a single court
acquire the information needed to fashion such a standard?1
1 6'
Even as the lawsuits were breaking down, and as the
commissions began making payments, Eizenstat intervened, and
brought with him the inherent threat of increased political
pressure and economic sanctions. 6 However, he also brought the
Clinton administration's willingness to "intervene in all current
lawsuits to support their dismissal," and a willingness to play off
the Germans' desire of "drawing a line under the Nazi era before
the dawn of a new millennium.' ' 63 The Swiss model was in place,
and as a result the sides agreed to settle for 10 billion deutsche
marks. 164 Clinton declared, "We close the 2 0 th century with an
extraordinary achievement that will bring an added measure of
material and moral justice to the victims of this century's most
terrible crime. It will help us start a new millennium on higher
ground."' 165  Echoing the sentiments of Abraham Foxman, the
National Director for the Anti-Defamation League, from the close
of the Swiss settlements years earlier, President Johannes Rau of
Germany offered,
I know that for many it is not really money that
matters. What they want is for their suffering to be
recognized as suffering and for the injustice done to
them to be named injustice. I pay tribute to all
those who were subjected to slave and forced labor
under German rule and in the name of the German
159. Id. at 218-19.
160. Id. at 219.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 226-27.





people, beg forgiveness. We will not forget their
suffering.'66
Rau's plea for forgiveness constituted an unprecedented
achievement, and for the first time in the restitution effort,
survivors received moral-not merely monetary-reparation.'67
Ironically, in the end it was the lawyers who received most of the
credit.'68 In the words of Stuart Eizenstat, "It was the American
lawyers, through the lawsuits they brought about in U.S. courts,
who placed the long-forgotten wrongs by German companies
during the Nazi era on the international agenda. Without
question, we would not be here without them."'
' 69
V. CONCLUSION
The Swiss restitution model was highly successful in
establishing international accountability for the atrocities of the
Holocaust. High-level, bipartisan political coalitions created
intense pressure on the European community. Competing class
action lawsuits forced countries to negotiate or face expansive
United States litigation procedures. Threats of crippling economic
sanctions lured the business community into the process. Diverse
independent commissions established the structure for
compromise. Together, these tactics proved successful in
Switzerland, Italy, France and Germany. They remain a viable
model that could be used to address modern social injustices such
as those occurring in Bosnia, Haiti or Somalia, or they could be
used to address unaccounted for past wrongs such as the history of
slavery in America. The Victim's Fortune is a gripping tale, and it
leaves the reader with a fuller understanding of the fundamental
importance of equality.
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